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 THE FEDERALIST: SELECTIONS 
A STUDY GUIDE 
1977-1997 
 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
No. 1  General Introduction (Hamilton) 
 
1. What is so important about the fate of the American union at this particular moment in history?  Is 
  the question of ratifying the constitution likely to hinge on its merits?  What are some of the 
  obstacles?  From which two classes are they apt to come from?  What are some reasons for 
  showing restraint even in the pursuit of truth? 
 
2. What does Hamilton expect from the opposition?  What sort of motives and passions does 
 Hamilton warn against?  What is the particular danger posed by ambitious demagogues? 
 
3. What is the purpose for this series of papers? 
 
No. 2  Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (Jay) 
 
1. How does John Jay draw upon elements of social contract theory to justify a single national 
 government?  What are some of the physical characteristics of independent America that favor 
  its habitation by one united people?  Why was a federal government instituted at an early period? 
  How early? 
 
2. What advantages did the members of the constitutional convention enjoy?  What attitude have 
 they taken toward its consideration for approval by the people?  What lessons may be learned 
  the events of 1774 (which gave rise to a Continental Congress)?  What considerations induced 
  the people to accept its leadership?  Why should the people to be even more inclined to do so 
  now? 
 
3. What was the great object of the people in forming the convention?  What would dissolution of the 
union signify? 
 
No. 3  The Same Subject Continued (Jay) 
 
1. What is the first object to be sought by a wise and free people?  Identify some of the just causes 
 of war and how do they bear on the issue of peace in America? 
 
2. What are the advantages of a national government (as opposed to independent states) in 
 assuring that other countries will not be given just cause to go to war?  Why would a national 
  government be more temperate and cool?  What lesson may be learned from the submission of 
  Genoa to France in 1685?  
 
No. 4  The Same Subject Continued (Jay) 
  
1. Why do absolute monarchs make war when it is not in their countries' interest?  Why might other 
 countries be jealous of the American states?  
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2. How would a national government give added protection against the pretended causes of war? 
  What are some of the advantages of unity?  Why might disunity invite war? 
 
No. 6  Dangers from Wars Between the States (Hamilton) 
 
1. Why would it be unwise to permit the American States to become wholly disunited or remain 
 united only in a partial confederacy?  What are the causes of hostility among nations? 
 
2. Does familiarity (or proximity) breed contempt (or hostility)? 
 
No. 9  The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection  (Hamilton) 
 
1. Why is a firm union vital to the peace and liberty of the states?  What lessons may be learned 
 from the histories of the Greek and Italian city-states ("petty republics")?  What conclusions have 
  the "advocates of despotism" drawn from their experience?  Is there any evidence to the 
  contrary? 
 
2. What improvements in the "science of politics" provide a means to enhance the positive aspects 
  of republican government while lessening its imperfections? 
 
3. What does Hamilton mean by "enlargement of the orbit" within which the system is to revolve? 
  How does it help lessen these imperfections? 
 
4. How is a confederacy useful in suppressing faction and guarding the internal tranquility of states? 
 How does a proper understanding of Montesquieu support this?  What are the advantages of a 
  Confederate Republic? 
 
5. Why is the distinction between a confederacy and a consolidation more subtle than accurate? 
  How does Hamilton view the modifications of federal authority?  How are the states made 
  constituent parts of the "national sovereignty?"  How does the new federal government compare 
  with the Lycian confederacy? 
 
No. 10  The Same Subject Continued  (Madison) 
 
1. Identify two ways of breaking and controlling the mischiefs of faction.  What are some of the 
 problems associated with such political divisions?  How does Madison define the term "faction?" 
 
2. Identify two methods of removing the causes of factions.  What is wrong with each?  What are the 
 latent causes of faction?  What is the most durable source?  What are some of the factions 
 identified by Madison and issues that lend themselves to factional dispute?  How are justice and 
 the public good determined? 
 
3. How does the republican principle help control the effects of faction?  How may the rights of 
 minorities be protected?  How may a majority be prevented from oppressing the rest? 
 
4. Why is a republic preferable to a pure democracy?  Why is a large republic preferable to a small 
 one?  What advantages are enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it?  What are 
  some of the sources of faction within the States? 
 
No. 15  The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union 
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    (Hamilton) 
 
1. What evidence is there that the union was advancing toward dissolution? 
 
2. What was the great and radical vice in the construction of the Confederation? 
 
3. Identify some of the ways in which a centrifugal tendency may be manifested? 
 
No. 17  The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Hamilton) 
 
1. Given the typical concerns of state government, why did Alexander Hamilton believe that it held 
 out “slender allurements to ambition?”  But if “mere wantonness and lust of domination” 
  (Augustine’s libido dominandi) were sufficient to “beget that disposition,” what will “control the 
  indulgence of so extravagant an appetite?” 
 
2. What view of human nature is suggested when Hamilton writes that “affections are commonly 
 weak in proportion to the distance or diffuseness of the object?”  What might destroy the “force of 
  hat principle?”  What are the “powerful auxiliaries” that Hamilton believes will incline people to 
  focus their ambitions on state government?  What is the “great cement of society?” 
 
3. How did feudal monarchs manage to succeed in prevailing over the vassals?  [Here Hamilton 
 seems to be undercutting his point].    
   
No. 39  The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles (Madison) 
 
1. What is it important that the new government be republican in form?  What are the distinctive 
 characteristics of that form?  Identify some features of the proposed constitution that are 
  "conformable" with this standard. 
 
2. How does Madison answer critics that the convention framed a national rather than a federal 
 government.  How does Madison distinguish between a "federal" and a "national" government? 
 
3. Using the federal/national distinction, how does Madison describe each of the following:  The act 
 establishing the constitution?  The House of Representatives?  The Senate?  The President? 
  The operation of the government?  The extent of its powers?  The method of amending the 
  constitution?  What does he conclude about its general character? 
 
No. 44  Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States (Madison) 
 
1. What is the justification for denying states the following powers: the granting of letters of marque 
 and reprisal; the right of coinage; issuing bills of credit; bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and 
  laws impairing the obligations of contracts?  Why may not states either restrict or regulate 
  commerce? 
 
2. Why is the "necessary and proper" (or elastic) clause both necessary and proper?  How may the 
 Constitution have otherwise tried to accomplish its purpose?  Would these alternatives been 
  satisfactory?  What is the remedy for congressional misconstruction of the Constitution?  
  [Question: What has subsequently changed that makes this restraint less reliable?] 
 
3. Why was it necessary to include the "supremacy clause"?  Why is it that all officers within the 
 federal system -- both of the United States and the several states -- be bound by oath to support 
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  the federal Constitution? 
 
No. 45  The Alleged Danger from the Powers of the Union to the State  Governments Considered 
  (Madison) 
 
1. Was the War for Independence fought for the sake of the dignity and sovereignty of individual 
states and particular municipal establishments?  Why does Madison complain about state 
sovereignty and compare it to the "impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made 
for the kings, not kings for the people?” 
 
2. Historically, which is more likely to threaten the balance: the general government or the states? 
That is, what did he see as the most typical threat to ancient and modern confederacies as well 
as feudalism?  Why is the same likely to be true in the present case?   
 
3. Give several reasons why State governments "have the advantage of [over] the Federal 
 government."  [Have some of Madison's points been invalidated by subsequent developments?]. 
 
4. How do the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal and state governments 
differ?  When is the federal government most likely to prevail over the state governments?  Why 
will giving the federal government more adequate powers for the national defense give the state 
governments an additional advantage over the federal government? 
 
5. What new powers have been added or old powers modified?  How does Madison argue 
 against the possibility of a consolidation of government? 
 
No. 46: The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared (Madison) 
 
1. Where does ultimate political authority reside?  What level of government enjoys "the first 
 and most natural attachment of the people?"  What evidence for this does Madison cite? 
 
2. Why are members of the federal branch more likely to be dependent on members of state 
governments than the reverse?  [Has this changed?].  Why would state governments have the 
advantage in defeating encroachments by the federal government?  How would such 
encroachments be regarded and treated? 
 
3. What sort of "visionary supposition" would be required to imagine the downfall of state 
 governments?  [Why does this not seem so visionary in retrospect?  Madison wrote before the 
French revolutionaries resorted to a national conscription law to raise a massive army that they 
fielded against the other powers of Europe.  Napoleon raised an even larger army by such 
means].  What insult to "the free and gallant citizens of America" was Madison unwilling to 
countenance? 
 
No. 51  On a Just Partition of Power 
 
1. Given the inadequacy of a merely external separation of powers, how is the defect to be 
 remedied? 
 
2. Why is it evident that each department should have a will of its own?  What are some difficulties 
 and how are these at least partially resolved?  In what other ways should departments be 
 rendered independent of each other? 
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3. What is the great security against a usurpation of power by one department?  What psychological 
 principle offers the best protection?  What auxiliary precautions are offered? 
 
4. Why should the legislative power in a republic be divided?  Why should the executive power be 
 fortified? 
 
5. What is the rationale for a separation of powers in single republic?  What is the double security 
for 
 the rights of the people inherent in a compound republic? 
 
6. By what two methods may the rights of minorities be protected?  Which is exemplified in the 
 federal republic of the United States?  What is the advantage of having a multiplicity of interests 
 and a multiplicity of sects?  Why does a federal system offer the best security? 
 
7. What is the end or goal of civil society?  How is it endangered by some weak forms of 
 government?  Why should even stronger individuals wish for a stronger government?  Why is a 
 larger society advantageous and how does the federal principle support the republican cause? 
 
No. 53   House of Representatives: Term 
 
1. How does the author answer the charge "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins?"  
What is the chief security against such tyranny in America?  What reasons may be given in 
support of biennial elections to the U.S. house?  What branches of knowledge are the peculiar 
concern of members of congress? 
 
2. Apart from the specialized knowledge required, what other considerations favor biennial terms? 
 What abuses may be expected from annual elections? 
 
No. 55  Number of Representatives 
 
1. What objections were offered against the planned size of the house?  How do you determine 
 whether the size of an assembly is too small or too large?   
 
2. What is the author's answer to the complaint that the House is too small?  How does it compare 
with the arrangement in the old continental congress?  From whence would the dangers come?  
How do the checks and balances meet the challenge? 
 
3. Why does the author rebuke certain "sincere friends of liberty?"  Where does "indiscriminate and 
unbounded jealousy" lead? 
 
No. 56  Duties of Representatives 
 
1. Why else is the house alleged to be too small?  How may this objection be answered? 
 
2. What are the proper objects of federal legislation?  Does the information pertaining to any of 
these require the expertise of more than a few people?  Where are members of congress likely to 
have gotten their previous experience? 
 
3. What foresight was shown at the convention that made provision for a growing population and the 
growing variety and complexity that would result from industrial progress? 
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4. What lessons may be gained from the experience of Great Britain? 
 
No. 57  Supposed Dangers 
 
1. What is the nature of the third charge against the house?  Why does it strike at the very root of 
republican government?  What precautions against "degeneracy" are taken under the 
Constitution? 
 
2. What are the federal requirements for exercising the right to vote?  What sort of men may be 
expected to hold the "representative trust?"  What factors may be relied upon to restrain them 
from abusing their power?  If members of congress should ever be permitted to pass laws that 
are not binding upon them, what will the people be prepared to tolerate? 
 
3. What are the cords that bind representatives to their constituents?  What objections are made by 
the critics that could not apply with equal force to the states?  How do the practices in Britain, 
New Hampshire, and New York differ?  Why would Philadelphia be better represented in the 
House than in its own state legislature? 
  
No. 58  Future Numerical Increase 
 
1. What is the constitutional provision for apportionment (and reapportionment) of seats in the 
House?  What peculiarity of the federal Constitution affords a double protection against an 
augmentation of Congress's power? 
 
2. How may the House defend itself from encroachment by the senate?  How does the varying 
population of states, including new ones, help maintain a political balance?  How does the power 
over the purse protect the House? 
 
3. What are the disadvantages of a larger assembly?  Why should a majority be sufficient for a 
quorum? 
 
No. 62  On the Constitution of the Senate 
 
1. What is the purpose of the specific constitutional qualifications for holding the office of senator?  
What is the double advantage of having senators elected or appointed by the state legislatures? 
 
2. How does the equal representation of states in the senate give congress both a federal and a 
national character and exemplify "a spirit of amity" rather than theory?  How does it preserve the 
"residuary sovereignty" of the states?  How does it provide an additional impediment against 
"improper acts of legislation?" 
  
3. How is the longer duration of senatorial appointment meant to safeguard the integrity of the 
system against usurpation?  Against impulsiveness?  Against errors from ignorance and lack of 
experience? Against mutability (instability)?  What are some of the effects of changeable, 
voluminous, or incoherent policy?  Who gains an unreasonable (or unfair) advantage from public 
instability? 
   
No. 63  Duration of the Senatorial Term   
 
1. Why would the esteem of foreign powers be forfeited by the absence of a senate?  Why is 
attention to the judgment of other nations important?  Why should the senate be small? 
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2. How does the frequency of popular elections create a lack of a due responsibility in the 
government to the people?  Into what two classes may the proper objects of government be 
divided?  Why does the House fail to answer the need for continuity?  What is the remedy for this 
defect? 
 
3. How may the senate restrain the temporary errors and delusions of the people?  Why would such 
an institution been useful to the ancient Athenians?  Why is it useful for the people to be spread 
over an extensive region?  Why are auxiliary precautions still needed? 
 
4. What has been the experience of ancient states -- both with and without a senate?  What does 
 their example have to teach Americans, if anything? 
 
5. What two sorts of abuses threaten tyranny?  What are the obstacles to the corruption of the 
 senate? 
 
6. By what means were other, more aristocratic "senates" -- the British, Spartan, Roman, and 
Carthaginian -- restrained or even corrupted by the popular assembly? 
 
No. 67  The Presidency 
 
1. What sort of misrepresentation, even caricature, has been directed at the office of president?  
What sort of attitudes is this propaganda designed to evoke?  [Note especially similarities to 
ancient Greek fears of oriental despotism and more recent fears of the Turkish Empire in the 
references to janissaries, seraglios, and "voluptuousness."]   
 
 [Compare a speech by Charles Ogle during the 1840 campaign on "The Royal Splendour of the 
President's Palace."  “Little Van,” as the president was called, was said to douse his whiskers 
with French eau de cologne, sleep in a Louis XV bedstead, sip soupe a la reine with a golden 
spoon, eat pate de foie gras from a silver plate, and ride in a gilded British-made coach.] 
 
2. How does Hamilton dispose of the notion that the president might be able to fill vacancies in the
 senate?  What is the purpose of the clause concerning temporary appointments during recess? 
 What is the constitutional provision for filling senatorial vacancies?  What attitude does Hamilton 
take toward the author [New York Gov. George Clinton in Cato, No. 5] of this allegation? 
 
No. 68  Mode of President's Appointment   
 
1. What is the rationale for an electoral college?  What safeguards were taken to ensure stability? 
 
2. Identify some of the obstacles to intrigue and corruption.  How has the danger of raising a foreign 
agent (or someone beholden to the powers that be) to the presidency been reduced?  How is he 
rendered independent of all but the people for remaining in office? 
 
3. How does this system favor more qualified candidates?  What two reasons justify adding the 
office of Vice President?  How does this compare with the office of lieutenant governor in New 
York? 
 
No. 69  Characteristics of the Proposed Executive 
 
1. How does the office compare with that of the English monarch, on the one hand, and that of the 
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New York governor, on the other hand? 
 
2. Why is a president's four-year term a less potentially dangerous influence than the English king's 
hereditary tenure or the New York governor's three-year term?  How does the President compare 
with the other two with respect to removal from office and exercise of a negative (veto)?  Where 
does his power as commander-in-chief differ? 
 
3. What makes the description of the president's pardoning power, which excludes cases involving 
impeachment, less dangerous that that of the New York governor? 
 
4. How does the President's power of appointment compare with that of the New York governor? 
 
No. 70  Energy in the Executive 
 
1. What was the purpose of the Roman office of dictator?  What is the result of having a feeble (or 
irresolute) executive? 
 
2.   What are the ingredients that constitute energy in the executive?  That constitute safety in the 
republican sense?  What is the advantage of having a single executive and a numerous 
legislature? 
 
3. How may the unity of the executive be destroyed?  What do we learn from the Roman experience 
with a dual or plural executive (consuls and tribunes)?  What might be the consequences of 
differences of opinion or personal jealousy?  Given their respective functions, why are such 
considerations of less concern in the legislative than in the executive branch? 
 
4. What are two kinds of responsibility?  In what ways does plurality destroy each?  Why is an 
executive council unnecessary in a republic?  Why is it likely to be positively dangerous? 
 
No. 71  Duration in Office 
 
1. What two purposes are served by providing the executive with a longer term in office (the second 
is dealt with in No. 72)? 
 
2. What are the advantages of firmness of tenure?  Why is a "lame duck" apt to be hesitant to 
exercise power?  Instead of "servile pliancy" or "an unqualified complaisance to every sudden 
breeze of passion," what is demanded of an executive by the republican principle? 
 
3.   Why is such personal firmness especially important in the relations of the executive with the 
legislature?  Why is it important for the different branches to be independent of each other? 
 
4. How does a longer tenure contribute toward the desired firmness and independence of the 
magistrate? 
 
No. 72  Stability of Administration 
 
1. Which officials should be dependent on the chief magistrate for their appointment, or nomination, 
and be subject to his superintendence?  Why is the stability of administration intimately 
connected with the duration of the executive magistrate in office? 
 
2. If executive firmness is connected with duration, why is re-eligibility necessary to prolong the 
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talents and virtues of a chief executive? 
 
3. Identify several ill effects of temporary or perpetual exclusion (term limits).  How does the hope of 
continuing in office serve as an inducement to good behavior and to a willingness to undertake 
lengthy and risky projects?  How might it serve to restrain avarice and prevent usurpation? 
 
4. When would a change of administration be especially detrimental to the community?  Should 
administrative stability be a source of concern as long as the option of changing exists?  
 
5. What are the supposed advantages of term limits and how does Hamilton dispose of them?  
Does he sense a danger of usurpation when personal ambition combines with popularity? 
 
No. 73  Salary and the Veto Power 
 
1. What would give the legislature a power of intimidation or seduction over the executive? 
 
2. What two distinct purposes are served by the president's negative (veto)?  Which of the two is the 
"primary inducement?"  How does Hamilton deal with criticisms of its propriety?  Why is the veto 
apt to be used cautiously? 
 
3. Is there more danger that the veto might be used too much, or too little?  Why is a qualified 
negative more likely to be used than an absolute one?  What are the hazards of a direct and 
categorical negative?  How would its existence tend to encourage greater caution by the 
legislature? 
 
4. What objections does he make to the New York system, which vests the negative in a council that 
includes judges? 
 
No. 74  President as Commander-in-Chief 
 
1. How does Hamilton dispose of any objections to this provision?  How does he treat the pardoning 
power?  In a practical sense, what does Hamilton mean by saying that "the sense of responsibility 
is always strongest in proportion as it is undivided?" 
 
2. Why does Hamilton object to making it depend on consent of the legislature?  Why might 
timeliness be important? 
 
No. 75  Treaties 
 
1. What objections have been made to the joint responsibility of president and the senate for making 
treaties?  Why does Hamilton consider the power of making treaties, strictly speaking, neither 
legislative nor executive in function? 
 
2. In the absence of a hereditary monarch to take responsibility, why is it "utterly unsafe and 
improper to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of four years' duration?"  Why should it not 
be entrusted to the senate alone? 
 
3. Why should the treaty-making power be kept from the house?  Why should a 2/3 vote of the 
senators present be sufficient to ratify? 
 
No. 76  Appointments 
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1. By what three methods may appointments be made?  Why does Hamilton believe that "one man 
of discernment" is a more appropriate choice for exercising this power than a "body of men?"  
Why is appointment by an assembly inappropriate and unlikely to competently weigh the "intrinsic 
merit of the candidate?" 
 
2. Why does the nomination of candidates by the president have all the advantages of giving him 
"sole and undivided responsibility" of appointment while avoiding some of its disadvantages?  
Why is it unlikely that a nomination will be overruled by the senate?  Why is it important then that 
the president cooperate with the senate? 
 
3. Is it likely that the president will be able to secure senatorial approval by corrupt means?  How 
does the Constitution itself tend to minimize this possibility? 
 
No. 77  Stability of Administration 
 
1. How does the necessity of senatorial cooperation with the president contribute to the stability of 
the administration?  [What more recent innovation was designed to counteract the politics of 
spoils that resulted from two-party competition?] 
 
2. How does Hamilton dispose of the notion that either the president or the senate would have an 
undue influence over the other?  Who is most apt to be blamed for a bad nomination?  What is 
wrong with the New York system of appointment by council? 
 
3.   Why does enlarging the size of the body responsible for appointments reduce the possibility of 
cabal or intrigue?  Why would the advantages of cooperation with the senate be defeated if the 
task of cooperation on appointments be entrusted to the house? 
 
4. Why should the president be able to convene congress, especially the senate, upon extraordinary 
occasions?  In sum, does the office of president combine the requisite attributes of energy and 
accountability to the people?  How is abuse of power by the chief magistrate to be restrained? 
 
No. 78  The Judiciary Department (Hamilton) 
 
1. Why is the judiciary the "least dangerous" branch? 
 
2. What is Hamilton's view of judicial review? 
 
3. Regarding contradictory laws, what is the role of judicial construction? 
 
4. Why is an independent judiciary an important safeguard against oppression? 
 
5. What will protect against arbitrary discretion in the courts?  
